Abstract. We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a fixed probability. That is, in each step, the sensors return an observed state, and given the observed state, there is a probability distribution (due to the estimation error) over the actual current state. The controller must base its decision on the observed state (rather than the actual current state, which it does not know).
Introduction
In a control system, a controller interacts with its environment through sensors and actuators. The controller observes the state of the environment through a set of sensors, computes a control signal that depends on the history of observed sensor readings, and feeds the control signal to the environment through actuators. The state of the environment is then updated as a function of the control signal as well as a disturbance signal that models external inputs to the environment. In a reactive setting, the sense-compute-actuate cycle repeats forever, resulting in an infinite trace of environment states. The objective of the controller is to ensure that the trace belongs to a given specification of "good" traces. The controller synthesis problem asks, given the dynamical law that specifies how the environment state changes according to the controller inputs and external disturbances, and a specification of good traces, to synthesize a control law that ensures that the environment traces are good, no matter how external disturbances behave.
Controller synthesis has been studied extensively for deterministic games with ω-regular specifications [5, 14, 13] . In this setting, the problem is modeled as a game on a graph. The vertices of the graph represent system states, and are divided into "controller states" and "disturbance states." At a controller state, the controller chooses an outgoing edge and moves to a neighboring vertex along this edge. At a disturbance state, the disturbance chooses an outgoing edge and moves along this edge. This continues ad infinitum, defining a sequence of states. If this sequence satisfies the specification, the controller wins; otherwise, the disturbance wins. The games are called perfect observation, since both players have exact knowledge of the current state and the history of the game.
The study of perfect-observation deterministic games have been extended to systems with partial observation, in which the controller can only observe part of the environment's state [15, 7] , and to stochastic dynamics [12, 8, 10, 11] , in which the state updates happen according to a probabilistic law.
The "standard model" of partial-observation stochastic games [7, 3, 2] is described as an extension to the above graph model, by fixing an equivalence relation on the vertices (the "observation function"), and stipulating that the controller only sees the equivalence class of the current vertex, not the particular vertex the state is in. In addition, the transitions of the graph are stochastic: the controller and the disturbance each choose some move, and the next vertex is chosen according to a probability distribution based on the current vertex and the chosen move.
In this paper, we introduce a different, albeit natural, model of probabilistic uncertainty in controller synthesis. Consider a state given by n bits. The sensors used to measure the state are typically not perfect, and observing the state through the sensor results in some bits being flipped with some known probability (probabilistic noise). In applications where the controller observes the state bits through a network, then the probabilistic noise in the communication channels results in bits being flipped with some known probability (according to the classical Shannon's communication channel model). Thus, the controller observes n bits through the sensor, and this estimate defines a probability distribution over the state space for the current state. In contrast, we allow the disturbance to precisely observe the state, corresponding to a worst case assumption on the disturbance. The objective of the controller is to find a strategy that ensures that the system satisfies the specification under this probabilistic uncertainty on the current state. We distinguish between two models of the disturbance. In the first model, the disturbance observes the correct sequence of states as well as both the observation of the controller and the sequence of controller moves. In the second model, the disturbance observes the correct sequence of states as well as the sequence of controller moves (but not the observation of the controller). It turns out that the two models give rise to subtle differences in defining the probability measures on the games, as well as different complexities in the solution algorithms.
Our model (which we refer as games with probabilistic uncertainty) is inspired by analogous models of state estimation under probabilistic noise in continuous control systems. We believe this model of games with probabilistic uncertainty naturally captures the behavior of many sensor-based control systems. Intuitively, the standard model of partial-observation games represent "partial but correct information" where the controller can observe correctly only the first k < n bits of the state (i.e., the observation is partial as the controller observes only a part of the state bits, but the information about the observed state bits is always correct). In contrast, our model of games with probabilistic uncertainty represent "complete but uncertain information" where the controller can observe all the n bits of the state but with uncertainty of observation (i.e., the controller can observe all the bits, but each bit is correct with some probability). Since the type of uncertain information in our model is very different from the standard models of partial-observation games studied in the literature, the relationship between them is not immediate.
Our main contribution, along with the introduction of the natural model of games with probabilistic uncertainty, is establishing the equivalence of the new class of games and partial-observation games. Our main technical result is a polynomial-time reduction from this new model of games with probabilistic uncertainty to standard partial-observation games, and a converse reduction from partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) to games with probabilistic uncertainty. The results to establish the equivalence of the two classes of games which represent two different notions of information (partial but correct vs complete but uncertain) are quite intricate. For example, for the new class of games the inductive definition of probability measure is subtle and different from the classical definition of probability measure for probabilistic systems [17, 9] . This is because the controller observes a history that can be completely different from the actual history, whereas the environment (or disturbance) observes the actual history. We first inductively define a probability measure of observed history, given the actual history, and use it to define the probability measure inductively. We show how our polynomial constructions for reduction capture the subtleties in the probability measure, and by establishing precise mapping of strategies (which is the heart of the proof of correctness of reduction) we obtain the desired equivalence result.
In the positive direction, our reduction allows us to solve controller synthesis problems for games with probabilistic uncertainty against ω-regular specifications, using algorithms of [7, 2] . In the negative direction, we get lower bounds on the hardness of problems by using known lower bounds for POMDPs using the hardness results of [1, 6] . In particular, with our reductions we establish precisely the decidability frontier of games with probabilistic uncertainty for various classes of parity objectives (a canonical form to express ω-regular specifications); and for most of the decidable problems we establish EXPTIME-complete bounds, and in some cases 2EXPTIME upper bounds and EXPTIME lower bounds (see Table 1 ). Moreover, our reduction allows the rich body of algorithms (such as symbolic and anti-chain based algorithms [7, 2] ) for partial-observation games, along with any future algorithmic developments for partial-observation games, to be applicable to solve games with probabilistic uncertainty. In summary, our results provide precise decidability frontier, optimal complexity (in most cases), and algorithmic solutions for games with probabilistic uncertainty, that is a natural model for control problems with state estimation under probabilistic noise.
Games with Probabilistic Uncertainty
In this section we introduce a class of games with probabilistic imperfect information, and call them games with probabilistic uncertainty. Probability distribution. A probability distribution on a finite set A is a function κ : A → [0, 1] such that a∈A κ(a) = 1. We denote by D(A) the set of probability distributions on A. Game structures with probabilistic uncertainty. A game structure with probabilistic uncertainty consists of a tuple G = (L, Σ I , Σ O , ∆, un), where (a) L is a set of locations; (b) Σ I and Σ O are two sets of input and output alphabets,
is a probabilistic transition function that given a location, an input and an output letter gives the probability distribution over the next locations; and (d) un : L → D(L) is the probabilistic uncertainty function that given the true current location describes the probability distribution of the observed location. If un is the identity function we obtain perfect-observation games.
Intuitively, a game proceeds as follows. The game starts at some location ℓ ∈ L. Player 1 observes a state drawn from the distribution un(ℓ), which represents a potentially faulty observation process. Intuitively, at every step the player can observe the value of all variables that corresponds to the state of the game, but there is a probability that the observed value of some variables are is incorrect. Player 2 observes the "correct" state ℓ. Given the observation of the history of the game so far, Player 1 picks an input alphabet σ i ∈ Σ i . Player 2 then picks an output letter σ o ∈ Σ o : we consider two variants, (1) Player 2 only observes the history of correct locations and the moves of the players; and (2) Player 2 observes the history of correct locations, the moves of the players, and also observes the history of observed locations of Player 1. The state of the game is updated to ℓ ′ with probability
. . of locations, input letter, and output letter, such that for all
The prefix up to ℓ n of the play ρ is denoted by ρ(n), its length is |ρ(n)| = n+1 and its last element is Last(ρ(n)) = ℓ n . The set of plays in G is denoted by Plays(G), and the set of corresponding finite prefixes is denoted Prefs(G). Strategies. A strategy for Player 1 observes the finite prefix of a play and then selects an input letter (pure strategies) or a probability distribution over input letters in Σ i . Formally, a pure strategy for Player 1 is a function α : Prefs(G) → Σ i , and a randomized strategy for Player 1 is a function α : Prefs(G) → D(Σ i ). Similarly, pure and randomized strategies for Player 2 are defined as functions β :
, respectively. Note that Player 2 sees Player 1's choice of input action at each step. In the case where Player 2 observes also the history of observed locations, the pure and randomized strategies are defined as functions β :
, respectively, where the output letter is chosen based on the original history and observed history. We refer to strategies that observes both histories as "all-powerful" strategies for Player 2.
Outcomes. The outcome of two randomized strategies α for Player 1 and β for Player 2 from a location ℓ ∈ L is the set of plays
. . gives the sequence of observations made by Player 1 using the probabilistic uncertainty function. Note that this sequence may be incorrect with some probability due to probabilistic uncertainty in the observation. We denote this set of plays as Outcome(G, ℓ, α, β). The outcome of two pure strategies is defined analogously, considering pure strategies as degenerate randomized strategies which pick a letter with probability one. The outcome set of the pure (resp. randomized) strategy α for Player 1 in G is the set Outcome 1 (G, ℓ, α) of plays ρ such that there exists a pure (resp. randomized) strategy β for Player 2 with ρ ∈ Outcome(G, ℓ, α, β). The outcome set Outcome 2 (G, ℓ, β) for Player 2 is defined symmetrically. Probability measure. Given strategies α and β, we define the probability measure Pr α,β ℓ0 (·). The definition of the probability measure is subtle and non-standard as the prefix that Player 1 observes can be completely different from the original history. For a finite prefix ρ ∈ Prefs(G), let Cone(ρ) denote the set of plays with ρ as prefix. We will define Pr α,β ℓ0 (·) for cones, and then by Caratheodary extension theorem [4] there is a unique extension to all measurable sets of paths. To define the probability measure we also need to define a function ObsSeq(ρ), that given a finite prefix ρ, gives the probability distribution over finite prefixes ρ ′ , such that ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ ′ ) denotes the probability of observing ρ ′ given the correct prefix is ρ. The base case is as follows:
The inductive definition of ObsSeq is as follows: for a prefix ρ of length n + 1
} the sequences of same length as ρ such that the sequence of input and output letter matches (i.e., the set of action-matching prefixes). Note that for non action-matching prefixes the observation sequence function always assigns probability zero. The inductive case for the probability measure is as follows: for a prefix ρ of length n + 1 with last state ℓ n , we have
i.e., ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ ′ ) gives the probability to observe ρ ′ , then α(ρ ′ )(σ i n ) denotes the probability to play σ i n given the strategy and observed sequence ρ ′ , and since Player 2 observes the correct sequence the probability to play σ o n is given by β(ρσ i n )(σ o n ) (Player 2 observes ρ), and the final term ∆(ℓ n , σ i n , σ o n )(ℓ n+1 ) gives the transition probability. If β is an all-powerful strategy, then β observes both the correct history ρ and the observed history ρ ′ , and then the definition is as follows:
Winning objectives. An objective for Player 1 in G is a set φ ⊆ Plays(G) of plays. A play ρ ∈ Plays(G) satisfies the objective φ, denoted ρ |= φ, if ρ ∈ φ. We consider ω-regular objectives specified as parity objectives (a canonical form to express all ω-regular objectives [16] ). For a play
. ., we denote by ρ k the k-th location ℓ k of the play and denote by Inf(ρ) the set of locations that occur infinitely often in ρ, that is, Inf(ρ) = {ℓ | ∀i∃j : j > i and ℓ j = ℓ}. We consider the following classes of objectives.
Reachability and safety objectives. Given a set T ⊆ L of target locations, the reachability objective Reach(T )
requires that a location in T be visited at least once, that is, Reach(T ) = {ρ | ∃k ≥ 0 · ρ k ∈ T }. Dually, the safety objective Safe(T ) requires that only states in T be visited. Formally, Sure, almost-sure and positive winning. An event is a measurable set of plays, and given strategies α and β for the two players, the probabilities of events are uniquely defined. For an objective φ, assumed to be Borel, we denote by Pr α,β ℓ (φ) the probability that φ is satisfied by the play obtained from the starting location ℓ when the strategies α and β are used. Given a game G, an objective φ, and a location ℓ, we consider the following winning modes: (1) a strategy α for Player 1 is sure winning for the objective φ from ℓ ∈ L if Outcome(G, ℓ, α, β) ⊆ φ for all strategies β for Player 2; (2) a strategy α for Player 1 is almost-sure winning for the objective φ from ℓ ∈ L if Pr α,β ℓ (φ) = 1 for all strategies β for Player 2; and (3) a strategy α for Player 1 is positive winning for the objective φ from ℓ ∈ L if Pr α,β ℓ (φ) > 0 for all strategies β for Player 2.
Qualitative analysis of a game consists of the computation of the sure, almost-sure and positive winning sets. The sure (resp. almost-sure and positive) winning decision problem for an objective consists of a game and a starting location ℓ, and asks whether there is a sure (resp. almost-sure and positive) winning strategy from ℓ.
Partial-observation Stochastic Games
We now recall the usual definition of partial-observation games and their subclasses. We focus on partial-observation turn-based probabilistic games, where at each round one of the players is in charge of choosing the next action and the transition function is probabilistic. We will present a polynomial time reduction of games with probabilistic uncertainty to these games.
Partial-observation games.
A partial-observation stochastic game (for short partial-observation game or simply a game) is a tuple 
. (Actions).
A i (i = 1, 2) is a finite set of actions for Player i.
(Transition function).
For i ∈ {1, 2}, the probabilistic transition function for Player i is the function δ i : S i ×A i → D(S 3−i ) that maps a state s i ∈ S i and an action a i ∈ A i to the probability distribution δ i (s i , a i ) over the successor states in S 3−i (i.e., games are alternating).
(Observations
S is a finite set of observations for Player 1 that partitions the state space S, and similarly O 2 is the observations for Player 2. These partitions uniquely define functions obs i : S → O i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, that map each state to its observation such that s ∈ obs i (s) for all s ∈ S. We will also consider the special case of one-sided games, where Player 2 is perfectly informed (has complete observation), i.e., O 2 = S, and obs 2 (s) = s for all s ∈ S (i.e., the partition consists of singleton states).
Special Class: POMDPs. We will consider one special class of partial-observation games called partial-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), where the action set for Player 2 is singleton (i.e., there is effectively only Player 1 and stochastic transitions). Hence we will omit the action set and observation for Player 2 and represent a POMDP as the following tuple G = S, A, δ, O , where δ :
Plays. In a game, in each turn, for i ∈ {1, 2}, if the current state s is in S i , then Player i chooses an action a ∈ A i , and the successor state is chosen by sampling the probability distribution δ i (s, a). A play in G is an infinite sequence of states and actions ρ = s 0 a 0 s 1 a 1 . . . such that for all j ≥ 0, if s j ∈ S i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, then there exists a j ∈ A i such that δ i (s j , a j )(s j+1 ) > 0. The definitions of prefix and length are analogous to the definitions in Section 2. For i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by Prefs i (G) the set of finite prefixes in G that end in a state in S i . The observation sequence of ρ = s 0 a 0 s 1 a 1 . . . for Player i (i = 1, 2) is the unique infinite sequence of observations and actions, i.e., obs(ρ) = o 0 a 0 o 1 a 1 o 2 . . . such that s j ∈ o j for all j ≥ 0. The observation sequence for finite sequences (prefix of plays) is defined analogously.
Strategies.
A pure strategy in G for Player 1 is a function α : Prefs 1 (G) → A 1 . A randomized strategy in G for Player 1 is a function α : Prefs 1 (G) → D(A 1 ). A (pure or randomized) strategy α for Player 1 is observation-based if for all prefixes ρ, ρ
We omit analogous definitions of strategies for Player 2. We denote by
G the set of all Player-1 strategies in G, the set of all observation-based Player-1 strategies, the set of all pure Player-1 strategies, the set of all Player-2 strategies in G, the set of all observation-based Player-2 strategies, and the set of all pure Player-2 strategies, respectively. In the setting where Player 1 has partial-observation and Player 2 has complete observation, the set B G of all strategies coincides with the set B O G of all observation-based strategies. We will require the players to play observation-based strategies. Outcomes. The outcome of two randomized strategies α (for Player 1) and β (for Player 2) from a state s in G is the set of plays ρ = s 0 a 0 s 1 a 1 . . . ∈ Plays(G), with s 0 = s, where for all j ≥ 0, if s j ∈ S 1 (resp. s j ∈ S 2 ), then α(ρ(j))(a j ) > 0 (resp. β(ρ(j))(a j ) > 0) and δ 1 (s j , a j ) = s j+1 (resp. δ 2 (s j , a j ) = s j+1 ). This set is denoted Outcome (G, s, α, β) . The outcome of two pure strategies is defined analogously by viewing pure strategies as randomized strategies that play their chosen action with probability one. The outcome set of the pure (resp. randomized) strategy α for Player 1 in G is the set Outcome 1 (G, s, α) of plays ρ such that there exists a pure (resp. randomized) strategy β for Player 2 with ρ ∈ Outcome(G, s, α, β). The outcome set Outcome 2 (G, s, β) for Player 2 is defined symmetrically.
Probability measure. We define the probability measure Pr α,β s (·) as follows: for a finite prefix ρ, let Cone(ρ) denote the set of plays with ρ as prefix. Then we have Pr α,β s (Cone(s)) = 1, and for a prefix of length n ending in a Player 1 state s n we have
and the definition when s n is a Player 2 state is similar. For a set Q of finite prefixes, we write Pr α,β s (Cone(Q)) for Pr α,β s ( ρ∈Q Cone(ρ)). The winning modes sure, almost-sure, and positive are defined analogously to Section 2, where we restrict the players to play an observation-based strategy. From the results of [7, 2, 1, 3, 6] we obtain the following theorem summarizing the results for partial-observation games and POMDPs. Theorem 1 ([7,2,1,3,6] 
Reduction: Games with Probabilistic Uncertainty to Partial-observation Games
We now present a reduction of games with probabilistic uncertainty to classical partial-observation games. Let G = (L, Σ I , Σ O , ∆, un) be a game with probabilistic uncertainty and we construct a partial
as follows:
1. The transition function δ 1 is deterministic and for (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) ∈ L × L and σ I ∈ Σ I we have
2. The transition function δ 2 captures both ∆ and un and is defined as follows:
. Intuitively, the first component of the game H keeps track of the real state of the game G, and the second component keeps track of the information available from probabilistic uncertainty. Hence Player 1 is only allowed to observe the second component which is the probability distribution over the observable state given the current state. 3. The observation mapping is as follows: we have O 1 = L; and obs 1 (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) = obs 1 (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , σ I ) = ℓ 2 , i.e., only the second component is observable. We will consider two cases for O 2 : for the reduction of all-powerful strategies we will consider Player 2 has complete-observation, and in the other case we have O 2 = L and Player 2 observes the first component that represents the correct history: i.e., obs 2 (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) = obs 2 (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , σ I ) = ℓ 1 . 4. For a parity objective in G given by priority function p G : L → {0, 1, . . . , d}, we consider the priority function p H in H as follows:
Correspondence of strategies. We will now establish the correspondence of probabilistic uncertain strategies in G and the observation based strategies in H. We present a few notations. ), we consider two histories in G as follows:
. Intuitively, g 1 gives the first component (which is the correct history) and g 2 gives the second component (which is the observed history). We now define the mapping of strategies from G to H: given strategy α G for Player 1, a strategy β G for Player 2, and an all-powerful strategy β A G for Player 2, in the game G, we define the corresponding strategies in H as follows: for a history ρ H and an action a i for Player 1 we have
Note that α H and β H are observation-based strategies, and β C H is a strategy with complete-observation, i.e., allpowerful strategies are mapped to complete-observation strategies. Hence for all-powerful strategies the reduction is to one-sided games. We will use g to denote the mapping of strategies, i.e., α H = g(α G ), β H = g(β G ), and β n be two prefixes in G. Intuitively, the first represent the correct history and the second the observed history. Then we consider the following set of histories in H: 
Note that since β H is observation-based it plays the same for all ρ H ∈ h 1 (ρ 1 G ), and similarly, since α H is observationbased it plays the same for all ρ H ∈ h 2 (ρ 2 G ). Also observe that the strategy β A G is an all-powerful strategy. We will use h to denote the mapping of strategies, i.e., α G = h(α H ), β G = h(β H ), and β
Given a starting state ℓ 0 ∈ G, consider the following probability distribution µ in H: µ(ℓ 0 , ℓ) = un(ℓ 0 )(ℓ). Given the mapping of strategies, our goal is to establish the equivalences of the probability measure. We introduce some notations required to establish the equivalence. For j ≥ 0, we denote by (τ 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the prefixes. The base case is as follows: let the length of prefixes ρ 
) (In the numerator all choices are fixed, and in denominator all possible choices of the second component)
Note that the crucial fact used in the above proof is in the second equality and the fact is that for all ℓ 2 n we have
, it is independent of ℓ 2 n ). Hence using the above equality and inductive hypothesis we have:
(By inductive hypothesis)
) (By previous equality)
The desired result follows.
We will now establish the equivalences of the probabilities of the cones.
Lemma 2.
For all finite prefixes ρ 1 G in G, the following assertions hold:
For all strategies
Proof. We will present the result for the first item, and the proof for second item is identical. Let us denote by α H = g(α G ) and β H = g(β G ). We will prove the result by induction on the length of the prefixes. The base case is as follows: let the length of the prefix ρ (Cone(ℓ 0 )) = 1, and Pr αH ,βH µ (Cone(h 1 (ℓ 0 ))) = 1, and for all other cones of length 1 the probability is zero. This completes the base case.
We now consider the inductive case: by inductive hypothesis we assume that Pr αG,βG ℓ0
Let ℓ n be the last state of ρ 1 G . We first consider the left-hand side (LHS):
Above the first equality is by definition, the second equality by inductive hypothesis, and the last equality is obtained from Lemma 1 as follows: by Lemma 1 we have ObsSeq(ρ
, and hence
We now consider the right-hand side (RHS) Pr
G a n b n ℓ n+1 ))) and the RHS can be expanded as: (below for brevity we write ρ = h 12 (ρ
Since we have
the above expression for RHS is equivalently described as:
, it follows that LHS is equal to the RHS. The result for correspondence for allpowerful strategy β A G is essentially copy-paste of the above proof replacing appropriately β G by β A G . This completes the proof and the desired result follows.
It follows that there is a sure, almost-sure, positive winning strategy in G for Parity(p G ) iff there is a corresponding one in H for Parity(p H ) and hence from Theorem 1 we obtain the following result. 
Reduction: POMDPs to Games with Probabilistic Uncertainty
In this section we present a reduction in the reverse direction and show that POMDPs with parity objectives can be reduced to games with probabilistic uncertainty and parity objectives. We first present the reduction and then show the correctness of the reduction by mapping prefixes, strategies, and establishing the equivalence of the probability measure.
Reduction: POMDPs to games with probabilistic uncertainty. Let H = (S, A, δ, O) be a POMDP with a parity objective φ, we construct the game of probabilistic uncertainty G = (L, Σ I , Σ O , ∆, un) as follows:
, the transition function is same as the transition function of the POMDP. In other words, the state space is the same, the action choices of the POMDP corresponds to the input action choice, and the output action set is singleton, and the transition function mimics the transition function of the POMDP. Below we use the probabilistic uncertainty to capture the partial-observation of the POMDP.
-The uncertainty function is as follows:
The parity objective is the same as the original parity objective. Mapping of prefixes. Given a prefix (or a finite history) ρ H = s 0 a 0 s 1 a 1 s 2 . . . s n in H we construct a prefix in G as ρ G = s 0 a 0 ⊥s 1 a 1 ⊥s 2 . . . s n by simply inserting the ⊥ actions. This construction defines a bijection h : Prefs H → Prefs G between prefixes. We can naturally extend the mapping to sets of prefixes. Let
Lemma 3. For prefixes ρ, ρ
′ in G the following assertion holds:
Proof. We prove the result by induction on the length of prefixes. We will only consider ρ and ρ ′ that have the same length, as otherwise by definition the observation sequence probability is 0. We first consider the base case. Base case. Let ℓ 0 be the initial state. Then ρ = ℓ 0 and let ρ ′ = ℓ for some ℓ ∈ L. Then:
if ℓ 0 and ℓ have the same observation and 0 otherwise. This proves the base case. Inductive step. We now consider prefixes of length n + 1, and by inductive hypothesis the result holds for prefixes of length n. Then ObsSeq(ρa n ⊥ℓ n+1 )(ρ ′ a n ⊥ℓ
). We now consider two cases to complete the proof.
). It follows that one of the factors (ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ ′ ) or un(ℓ n+1 )(ℓ ′ n+1 )) is equal to 0 and hence:
ObsSeq(ρa n ⊥ℓ n+1 )(ρ ′ a n ⊥ℓ
. . a n−1 o n a n o n+1 . Then:
Mapping of strategies. We first present the mapping of strategies from H to G and then from G to H. Note that in the game G, there is no choice for Player 2, and hence we remove the Player 2 strategies in the descriptions below. Mapping strategies from H to G. Let α H be an observation-based Player-1 strategy in H and ρ G = s 0 a 0 ⊥s 1 a 1 ⊥s 2 . . . s n be a prefix in G. We define a Player-1 strategy α G in G as follows:
Mapping strategies from G to H. Let α G be a Player-1 strategy in G and ρ H = s 0 a 0 s 1 a 1 s 2 . . . s n be a prefix in H with o = o 0 a 0 o 1 a 1 o 2 . . . o n as its observation sequence. Note that as Player 2 has only one strategy (always playing ⊥) we omit it from discussion. Note that every ρ ∈ ActMt(h(ρ H )) can have different actions with different probabilities enabled. We define a Player-1 strategy α H in H as follows: for an action a ∈ A we have
Correspondence of probabilities. In the following two lemmas we establish the correspondence of the probabilities for the mappings.
Lemma 5. Let us consider the mapping of strategies from H to G. For all prefixes ρ H in H we have
Proof. The proof is based on induction on the length of the prefix ρ H . We denote the last state of ρ H by ℓ n . Base case. For prefixes of length 1 where ρ H = ℓ 0 we get Pr αH µ (Cone(ℓ 0 )) = 1 and Pr αG l0 (Cone(h(ℓ 0 ))) = 1. For all other prefixes both sides are equal to 0. Hence the base case follows. Inductive step. By inductive hypothesis we assume the result for prefixes ρ H of length n (i.e., we assume that Pr αH µ (Cone(ρ H )) = Pr αG ℓ0 (Cone(h(ρ H )))) and will show that Pr αH µ (Cone(ρ H a n ℓ n+1 )) = Pr αG ℓ0 (Cone(h(ρ H a n ℓ n+1 ))).
First we expand the left hand side (LHS) and by definition we get that:
We now expand the right hand side (RHS) and get that:
Using inductive hypothesis, the definition of the game, and the mapping of strategies we get on RHS:
For all ρ ′ that does not match the observation sequence of h(ρ H ), we have ObsSeq(h(ρ H ))(ρ ′ ) = 0 (by Lemma 3), and as α H is observation based for all ρ ′ ∈ ActMt(ρ H ) that matches the observation sequence of h(ρ H ), the strategy α H plays the same. Let us denote by ρ ′ ≈ h(ρ H ) that ρ ′ matches the observation sequence of h(ρ H ). Then we have
where the first equality follows as for all sequences ρ ′ that does not match the observation sequence of h(ρ H ) we have ObsSeq(h(ρ H ))(ρ ′ ) = 0; the second equality follows as for all ρ
)(a n ) = α H (ρ H )(a n ) (as α H is observation based); and the last equality follows because as ObsSeq is a probability distribution we have
Thus we have that LHS and RHS coincide and this completes the proof.
Lemma 6.
Let us consider the mapping of strategies from G to H. For all prefixes ρ G in G we have
Proof. The inductive proof is as follows and we will denote the last state of ρ G as ℓ n . The base case is similar to the base case of Lemma 5. We now present the inductive case.
Inductive step. By inductive hypothesis we assume the result for prefixes ρ G of length n (i.e., we assume that Pr αH µ (Cone(h −1 (ρ G ))) = Pr αG ℓ0 (Cone(ρ G ))) and will show that
First we expand the right hand side (RHS) and by definition we get that:
Pr αG ℓ0 (Cone(ρ G a n ℓ n+1 )) = Pr ObsSeq(ρ G )(ρ ′ ) · α G (ρ ′ )(a n ) · ∆(ℓ n , a n , ⊥)(ℓ n+1 )
 
As ∆(ℓ n , a n , ⊥)(ℓ n+1 ) does not depend on ρ ′ we get:
Pr αG ℓ0 (Cone(ρ G a n ℓ n+1 )) = Pr αG ℓ0 (Cone(ρ G )) · ∆(ℓ n , a n , ⊥)(
We will now show that the expansion of the left hand side (LHS) also gives the same expression. Let ρ H = h −1 (ρ G ). By expanding the LHS we get: Pr αH µ (Cone(h −1 (ρ G a n ℓ n+1 ))) = Pr αH µ (Cone(h −1 (ρ G ))) · α H (h −1 (ρ G ))(a n ) · δ(ℓ n , a n )(ℓ n+1 ) = Pr αH µ (Cone(ρ H )) · α H (ρ H )(a n ) · δ(ℓ n , a n )(ℓ n+1 ) = Pr αH µ (Cone(ρ H )) · α H (ρ H )(a n ) · ∆(ℓ n , a n , ⊥)(ℓ n+1 ) = Pr αG ℓ0 (Cone(ρ G )) · α H (ρ H )(a n ) · ∆(ℓ n , a n , ⊥)(ℓ n+1 );
where the first equality is by definition; the second equality is by simply re-writing h −1 (ρ G ) as ρ H ; the third equality is by the definition of ∆ and δ; and the final equality is the inductive hypothesis. By definition of α H we have α H (ρ H )(a n ) = ρ ′ ∈ActMt(ρG) ObsSeq(ρ G )(ρ ′ ) · α G (ρ ′ )(a n ) ; and hence it follows that LHS and RHS coincide.
Thus the desired result follows.
The previous two lemmas establish the equivalence of the probability measure and completes the reduction of POMDPs to games with probabilistic uncertainty. Hence the lower bounds for POMDPs also gives us the lower bound for games with probabilistic uncertainty. Hence Theorem 2, along with the reduction from POMDPs and Theorem 1 gives us the following result for games with probabilistic uncertainty (the results also summarized in Table 1 ). 
Conclusion
In this work we considered games with probabilistic uncertainty, which is natural for many problems, and has not been considered before. We present a reduction of such games to classical partial-observation games and a reduction of POMDPs to games with probabilistic uncertainty. As a consequence we establish the precise decidability frontier for games with probabilistic uncertainty. Table 1 summarizes our results. For most problems we establish EXPTIMEcomplete bounds. For some decidable problems we establish 2EXPTIME upper bounds, and EXPTIME lower bounds, and establishing the precise complexity results are interesting open problems.
